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A PROPOSAL TO MAKE LEX DOMICILII THE REQUIRED
CHOICE OF LAW UNDER ARTICLE 28
OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
INTRODUCTION
Since international air travel began some forty years ago, the United
States has sought through treaty negotiations to ensure that Americans
injured, or the survivors of Americans killed in international air travel
are able to receive adequate compensation in damages. But amounts con-
sidered adequate by Americans have to others seemed exorbitant. As a
result, the United States has been unsuccessful in achieving a substantial
increase in the limit of liability imposed by existing treaties.
In May, 1966, under the threat of withdrawal from the Warsaw Con-
vention, 1 the-United States was able to extract an "interim agreement"
from the principal international carriers under which they agreed to a
voluntary waiver of liability up to $75,000. But a new formal treaty
must yet be negotiated.
Recent developments in United States case law may provide the basis
for a United States initiative in the future treaty negotiations. This Note
will examine these recent developments, and on the basis of the under-
lying considerations discerned therein, will propose that, to meet the
objections of those who oppose an increase in the existing limit on lia-
bility, domicile be adopted as the required uniform choice of law in
awarding damages in air accident litigation. Adoption of this proposal
would make possible the achievement of the United States' objective of
a higher limit on liability and would also serve to establish true interna-
tional uniformity in compensation.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND2
In October, 1929, thirty nations,3 realizing that "what engineers are
doing for machines, we must do for the law," 4 met in Warsaw, Poland,
1. See note 6 infra.
2. For a comprehensive discussion, see Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, The United
States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. REv. 497 (1967).
3. Germany, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark,
Egypt, Germany, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Australia, South
Africa, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Luxemburg, Mexico, Norway, The
Netherlands, Poland, Rumania, Russia, Sweden, Switzerland, Venezuela, and Yugo-
slavia. The United States did not participate, but was represented by observers.
4. Minutes, II CONFiRmEcE IN TERNAMONALE M DROIT Pmivi AiEiuN, 4-12 OcroRRE
1929, VARSOVIE 17 (1930).
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to formulate uniform rules for regulating international air transportation.
That conference produced the Warsaw Convention,' one of the most
widely accepted treaties extant on private international law.0 The Treaty
was the result of four years of study and drafting by the interim Comit6
Internationale Technique d'Experts Juridique Aeriens (CITEJA), cre-
ated at an earlier International Conference on Private Air Law in Paris
in 1925.
When CITEJA began its preparation for the Treaty in 1926, inter-
national air travel was just getting off the ground. Risks-both physical
and financial-were enormous at that uncertain stage of development.
The accident rate was high, and a major accident could have been
financially catastrophic to the fledgling enterprise. One of the foremost
objectives of the Treaty's planners, therefore, was to protect the inter-
national air transportation industry financially by limiting the potential
liability of a carrier in case of an accident.7 Articles 17 and 20 of the
Convention established the presumptive liability of the carrier for dam-
age sustained by a passenger in the course of flight or while embarking
or disembarking,8 but Article 22 limited that liability to 125,000 francs9
-approximately 8,300 current U. S. dollars.'0
5. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, signed at Warsaw, October 12, 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (1929). The
United States did not participate in the Warsaw Conference and it was not until June,
1934, that the President submitted the Treaty to the Senate. The Senate gave its advice
and consent on June 15, 1934. The United States deposited its instrument of adherence
on July 31, 1934, and the President proclaimed the Treaty on October 29, 1934. 49
Star. 3000, T.S. No. 876 (1934).
6. As of January 1st 1968, the Convention was adhered to by 95 states. Members not
adhering to the Convention are two Eastern European states (Albania and Mongolia),
eight States of Asia and the Middle East (Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, South
Korea, Thailand, Turkey, and Yemen), and eleven Latin American States (Bolivia,
Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay). DEP'T OF STATE, TREATnES IN FoicE (1968).
7. See Minutes, supra note 4, at 135, and at 159.
8. Article 17 of the Convention reads:
The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death
or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury suffered by a pas-
senger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on
board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embarking
or disembarking.
9. Article 22 of the Convention reads:
(1) In the transportation of passengers the liability shall be limited to the
sum of 125,000 francs. Where, in accordance with the law of the court to
which the case is submitted, damages may be awarded in the form of
periodical payments, the equivalent capital value of the said payments
19681 1119
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Those who argued that the limit had not been set high enough pointed
out that recoveries for personal injury and death in the more developed
countries were usually higher than the limit imposed for international
travel by the Warsaw Convention. Furthermore, with the improvement
of air safety, and the growth of the insurance industry, it has become
apparent that the special protection given the international airline in-
dustry in 1929 is no longer necessary."'
A diplomatic conference to amend the Warsaw Convention was con-
vened at the Hague in September 1955.12 At that conference, the United
States sought an increase in the limit of liability to $25,000."3 During
the course of the conference, the United States delegation was forced to
compromise down to a limit of $16,000-twice that of Warsaw. The
Chairman of the United States delegation was later to conclude that
even this amount "was regarded by almost everyone familiar with the
matter as a clearcut victory for the United States." 14
shall not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the carrier
and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
10. At the time of the Warsaw Conference in 1929, 125,000 Poincar6 francs were
equivalent to approximately $4,900. After United States devaluation in 1933 the amount
has been equivalent to approximately $8,300. See Clare, Evaluation of Proposals to
Increase the Warsaw Convention Limit of Passenger Liability, 16 J. AIR L. & Com.
53, 54, 57 (1949).
11. See, e.g., Rhyne, International Law and Air Transportation, 47 MICH. L. Rav. 41
(1948); Lissitzyn, International Aviation Policy: The Warsaw Convention Today, 56
AM. Soc. Ir'L L. PRoc. 115 (1962); Sand, Limitation of Liability and Passengers' Ac-
cident Conpensation Under the Warsaw Convention, 11 Am. J. Coup. L. 21 (1962);
Karlin, Warsaw, Hague, the 88th Congress and Limited Damages in International Air
Crashes, 12 DE PAuL L. REv. 59 (1962); Kreindler, Denunciation of the Warsaw Con-
vention, 31 J. AIR L. & CoM. 291 (1965); Stephen, The Adequate Award in Interna-
tional Aviation Accidcnts, 527 INs. L. J. 711 (1966); Mendelsohn, Another View on the
Adequate Award in International Aviation Accidents, 531 INs. L. J. 197 (1967).
12. ICAO International Conference on Private Air Law, September 1955. The Con-
ference was the fourth in a series of conferences which formulated international
conventions and protocols on private air law since Warsaw in 1929. The intervening
conferences were held at Rome (1933), Brussels (1939), and Rome (1952). The Draft
Protocol for the Conference was prepared by the ICAO Legal Committee, and submitted
to the ICAO Council for circulation. After receiving generally favorable comments on
the Draft Protocol, the Council on April 5, 1954, made the final decision to convene
the Conference. See I, MINUTES, ICAO, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AIR
LAW XV-XVII, (1955).
13. Why that figure was selected poses a curious question since it was low by United
States standards even then. See I ICAO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PIvATE AIR
LAW 190 (1955); Calkins, Hiking the Limits of Liability at The Hague, PRocEEDINGS
OF THE AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L. 120 (1962).
14. Calkins, supra note 13, at 125.
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The Hague Protocol, as the product of the Hague Conference came
to be called, was never ratified and probably never will be ratified by
the United States. The Protocol was not submitted to the Senate by the
Eisenhower Administration until the summer of 1959,"5 and was not
considered by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee until the sum-
mer of 1961-six years after the Hague conference.
In 1961, the Kennedy Administration decided to take a fresh look at
the question of ratifying the Protocol, and at the question of the limit
under the Warsaw Convention in general. In July, 1961, the Interagency
Group on International Aviation (IGIA)' 6 undertook extensive new
consultations and discussions with industry and public representatives. 17
As a result of this renewed investigation, the IGIA recommended in
1964 that the Hague Protocol be ratified, but that ratification be ac-
companied by an automatic compulsory insurance scheme in the amount
of $50,000 for death or very serious personal injury. If the ratification
could not be accompanied by the insurance legislation, IGIA recom-
mended that the United States should then denounce the Convention."8
In the summer of 1965 it became obvious to the Administration that
the proposed insurance scheme stood no chance of enactment and that,
without the legislation, Senate ratification of the Protocol was unlikely.
Not wishing to experience defeat on a major treaty, and recognizing
the general dissatisfaction in the United States with the limits under
both the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol, 9 the Adminis-
tration decided to denounce the Treaty.
15. 105 CONG. REc. 14,195 (1959).
16. The Interagency Group on International Aviation (IGIA) was created by Presi-
dential Memorandum of August 11, 1960, 25 Fed. Reg. 7710 (1960). The Group is
composed primarily of the Departments of State, Commerce, Defense, the F.A.A., the
C.A.B., and more recently, the Department of Transportation.
17. Comments were requested from bar associations, professors, insurance companies,
the air lines, and the general public. Department of State Public Notice 196, 26 Fed.
Reg. 9684 (1961), 45 DEP'T STATE BuLL. 692 (1961). A public record of the answers
received is available in the Office of the General Counsel of the FAA, Washington,
D.C. A summary of the responses is printed in Senate Hearings 26-28.
18. See 108 CONG. REc. 16,652, 16,657-59 (1962); Department of State Press Release,
47 DT STATE BULL. 362-65 (1962).
19. During July and August several Senators spoke against both the Warsaw Con-
vention and the Hague Protocol on the floor of the Senate. 111 CONG. REc. 15,596
(remarks of Senator Yarborough); id. at 16,716 (remarks of Senator Ervin); id. at
17,881-84 (remarks of Senators Gore, Hartke, and Gruening); id. at 20,164 (remarks of
Senator Robert Kennedy). See Editorial, N.Y. Times, June 16, 1965, at 26, col. 1.
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Under Article 39 of the Convention, ° a six-month waiting period is
required for a denunciation to become effective. To be free of the War-
saw limits before the 1966 tourist season, the United States deposited
its formal notice of denunciation of November 15, 1965.21 The denun-
ciation would then become effective on May 15, 1966.
The door was left open, however, for further negotiation. The De-
partment of State indicated in a press release issued simultaneously with
the notice of denunciation:
The United States would be prepared to withdraw the notice
of denunciation deposited today if prior to its effective date of
May 15, 1966, there is a reasonable prospect of an international
agreement on limits of liability in international air transportation
in the area of one hundred thousand dollars per passenger or on
uniform rules but without any limit of liability and if, pending
the effectiveness of such international agreement, there is a pro-
visional agreement among the principal international airlines waiv-
ing the limits of liability up to seventy-five thousand dollars per
passenger. 22
In the meantime, the Council of the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization (ICAO) had resolved on October 28, to convene a special
ICAO meeting in February of 1966, in Montreal. It was hoped either
that the Conference could arrive at a solution or, at the least, that an
agreement between the U. S. and the international carriers, for an in-
terim arrangement voluntarily waiving the limit on liability by the car-
riers, could be concluded pending a call for a formal diplomatic con-
ference to revise the Warsaw Convention. The Conference closed after
two weeks of hard negotiation with no result and with only little hope
for any resolution.2a
20. Article 39 of the Convention reads:
(1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may denounce this conven-
tion by a notification addressed to the Government of the Republic of
Poland, which shall at once inform the Government of each of the High
Contracting Parties.
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the notification of
denunciation, and shall operate only as regards the party which shall have
proceeded to denunciation.
21. 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 923 (1965).
22. id. at 924.
23. See MiNtrEs AND DoCUMENTS (Volume I and II respectively) ICAO, S, CLArx
ICAO MEETINGS ON LimSrs FOR PASSENGERS UNDER THE WARsAW CONVENTION AND Ttm
HAGUE PROTOCOL (1966).
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In a last-ditch effort to prevent United States denunciation from be-
coming effective, the International Air Travel Association (IATA), in
cooperation with the United States Government, made a concerted ef-
fort to secure agreement by the principal international carriers to a
voluntary waiver of liability up to $75,000 under terms of absolute lia-
bility 2 4 Under intense pressure, IATA received the acceptance of prin-
cipal carriers operating into or out of the U S., and their respective
governments' approval, by the afternoon of May 12, 1966.
The IGIA met on Friday, May 13, to discuss whether the IATA
agreement should be accepted. At 5 p.m. on the afternoon of the last
day for withdrawal, the State Department announced that the IATA
proposed agreement had been accepted, and that the U S. denunciation
would be withdrawn.25
The IATA Interim Agreement, in brief, provides absolute liability
up to $75,000 per passenger traveling on any participating carrier and
on a journey to, from, or with a stopping place in the United States.2
24. See Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 2, at 586-96.
25. Department of State Press Releases No. 110 & 111, May 13 & 14, 1966; 54 DE.'T
STATE BuLL. 955-57 (1966); CAB Press Release 66-61, May 13, 1966.
26. Department of State Press Release No. 110, May 13, 1966; 31 Fed. Reg. 7302 (1966).
The Agreement applies only to airlines operating to, from, or with a stopping place
in the United States, and who have filed agreement with the CAB. An American
traveler therefore may still be subject to the $8,300 Warsaw limit if he is'injured while
flying on a Warsaw Convention flight aboard an airline that has not signed the Agree-
ment. According to information made available from the files of the Department of
State, the following 25 airlines, which either operate to the United States or carry
substantial numbers of American passengers, were still not parties to the interim ar-
rangement, at least as of November 27, 1967-
Airline
Aerocondor
Aerolineas El Salvador
Aerolineas Venezolanas (AVENSA)
Aerovias Quzsqueyana
All Nippon Airways
Area
Aviateca
Caledonian Airvays
Compana Dominicana de Aviacion
Compama Ecuatoriana
Lamca Airlines
Linea Aeropostal Venezolana (LAV)
Polynesian Airlines
Sahsa Honduras Airlines
Not party to Warsaw Convention.
Country
Colombia*
El Salvador
Venezuela
Dominican Republic*
Japan
Ecuador*
Guatemala*
United Kingdom
Dominican Republic*
Ecuador
Nicaragua*
Venezuela
New Zealand (Western Samoa)
Honduras*
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Although the agreement is characterized as interim, it has no terminal
date, and will likely continue for several years until a new treaty can
be negotiated.2
7
OBSTACLES TO AN INCREASE IN THE LIMIT ON LIABILITY
UNDER THE CONVENTION
Before proceeding to a discussion of the proposal as a possible solu-
tion to the liability limit controversy, it will be useful to define the
problem in terms of objectives-those of the United States, and of those
who oppose any substantial increase in the limit.
The United States Objective
The primary United States objective has been clear from the be-
ginning-to ensure adequate recoveries for American accident victims.
A higher limit than Warsaw, Hague, or even the Interim Agreement is
essential for the accomplishment of that objective.
At the first session of the Hague Conference the United States dele-
gation urged an increase in the limit to $25,000.28 In a paper presented
Airline Country
TAN Airlines Honduras*
Trans Globe Airways United Kingdom
Union de Transports Aeriens France
Ariana Afghan Airlines Afghanistan*
British Eagle International Airlines United Kingdom
Civil Air Transport Republic of China*
Garuda Indonesia
Iran Air Iran*
J.A.T. Yugoslavia
Lloyd Aero Boliviano Bolivia*
Thai International Airlines Thailand*
* Not party to Warsaw Convention.
It should be noted, of course, that there are other airlines, for example Air Afrique,
that are not parties but that are not included on this list, presumably because they
either do not operate to the United States or do not carry substantial numbers of
American travelers.
27. Furthermore, the Agreement is probably vulnerable to criticism that it is in
effect an amendment to an international treaty without the advice and consent of
the Senate. See Sincoff, Absolute Liability and Increased Damages in International
Aviation Accidents, 52 A.B.A.J. 1122 (1966).
28. See II DOCUMENT§, ICAO, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE AIR LAW 248
(1955); Calkins, Hiking the Limits of Liability at The Hague, PROCEEDINGS OF THE A M.
Soc'y oF INT'L L. 123 (1962).
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to the American Society of International Law at its annual meeting in
1962, the Chairman of the United States Hague Delegation outlined the
position taken by the United States at that Conference:
Our line of argument was that the general rule required com-
plete restitution for personal injury and death, or failing that,
compensation in damages for any injury done to persons or prop-
erty. The normal and proper rule is that liability should be un-
limited.2 9
The United States objective was also clearly expressed in the Novem-
ber 15, 1965, letter to the Polish Government transmitting notice of the
United States denunciation of Warsaw Convention.
The United States wishes to state that it gives this notification
solely because of the low limits of liability for death or personal
injury provided in the Warsaw Convention, even as those limits
would be increased by the protocol to amend the Convention
done at The Hague on September 28, 1965.30
At the Montreal Conference the United States delegation in its open-
ing statement31 presented the United States objective of a $100,000 limit,
and pointed out that Congressional and public concern in the United
States would not permit another summer to go by with American citi-
zens traveling under the Warsaw limit.32
29. Calkins, supra note 13, at 123 (Emphasis Added).
30. 53 DEP'T STATE BULL. 924 (1965) (Emphasis Added).
31. II Docu ENars ICAO SPECIAL ICAO MEETNG ON LIMITS FOR PASSENGERS UNDER
THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND TuE HAGUE PROTOCOL 174-78 (1966); 54 DEfPT STATE
BULL. 580 (1966).
32. Public awareness and criticism of the low limit under Warsaw began to crystallize
in the late 1940's when entertainer Jane Froman was seriously injured in a crash near
Lisbon in 1943. In spite of large medical bills and disabling injury which curtailed a
promising career she was limited to a recovery of only $8,300 from Pan American
because of the Warsaw limit. Ross v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 299 N.Y. 88, 85
N.E.2d 880 (1949), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 947 (1955). In January 1960, the son and
daughter-in-law of Senator Homer Capehart were killed in an Avianca crash on landing
at Montego Bay, Jamaica. Capehat v. Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., Civil
No. 10,315, E.D. Fla. (1963). Although recovery in the Capehart case was able to exceed
the Warsaw limit ($300,000) because of a willful misconduct finding, Senator Capehart
became very strongly opposed to the Warsaw and Hague limits. See remarks by George
Buschman, Counsel and Administrative Assistant to Senator Homer Capehart, PROCEED-
INGs A~mmcAN Soc'y hrr'L LAw 128 (1962). For other' congressional criticism see
note 19 supra. For examples of other major accidents causing public outcry against
1968] 1125
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
Recoveries in the United States in excess of the IATA Agreement
level of $75,000 are not unusual.8 The United States objective of a limit
in excess of $100,000 is therefore not unrealistic by American standards.
Objectives of Those Who Oppose any Substantial Increase in the Limit
The objectives of the low level proponents are not so clearly articu-
lated. The Chairman of the Hague delegation has stated:
It is difficult to put one's finger directly on the true reason.
Undoubtedly the standards of living and the per capita gross na-
tional product of the various countries concerned, in comparison
to our own, form part of the explanation. Possibly a more doc-
trinaire approach to legal matters on the part of the European law-
yer is responsible. In any event one thing is certain, the foreign
lawyers felt distrust, dismay, and disdain for the death claim com-
pensation system in force in the United States. I have never been
able to determine just how tangible this legal bogey man was-
whether it was grounded in a real fear of the economic conse-
quences of insurance costs which greatly increased verdicts might
entail, or whether it was a dislocation of the system they were
used to, or perhaps a philosophical insistence that human life
could not be measured in money. .... 34
Some have intimated that it is indeed the doctrinaire approach of cer-
tain European lawyers who represent their airlines privately, and their
governments in the ICAO Legal Committee, that presents a major ob-
stacle to the adoption of a high limit.', Whether this potential conflict
of interests has had or will continue to have an effect is an interesting
the Convention see Block v. Campagnie Nationale Air France, 229 F. Supp. 801 (N.D.
Ga. 1964) (Atlanta Art Assoc., killed on takeoff from Paris, June 3, 1962); Kelly v.
Societe Anonyme Belge d'Exploitation de la Navigation Aerienne, 242 F. Supp. 129
(E.D. N.Y. 1965) (U.S. Olympic Skating Team killed near Brussels, Feb. 15, 1961).
33. E.g., in Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893 (7th Cir. 1967), a trial
court without a jury, awarded $329,956 to a surviving wife and two minor children;
in United States v. Becker, 378 F.2d 319 (9th Cir. 1967), a jury awarded $322,995,
which was affirmed on appeal. There is no doubt that awards and settlements are also
on the increase elsewhere in the world, particularly in Western Europe. Statistics along
these lines are probably available in documents that were submitted by states to the
ICAO Panel of Experts. Unfortunately, the ICAO Council has classified these docu-
ments and the statistics are therefore not available.
34. Calkins, supra note 13, at 121.
35. Cabranes, Limitations of Liability in International Air Law: The Warsaw and
Rome Conventions Reconsidered. 15 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 660, 671 n.39 (1966).
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but probably unanswerable question. But apart from conflict of inter-
ests, there is the additional factor that several of the senior, and most
influential, state representatives to the ICAO Legal Committee are in-
dividuals who developed their conceptual approaches to air law at a
time when international aviation was still in its early stage of develop-
ment. As a consequence, their approach to the regulation of the aviation
industry is one based far more on protecting the airline than protecting
the passenger. In this respect, it might well be said that the influence of
the representatives of France and Spain-two of the most senior and
articulate representatives to the ICAO Legal Committee-may have had,
and may still have, an inordinate influence in obstructing the path to
higher limits.
Certainly, no one can realistically argue today that a low limit is
needed to protect airline development.0 6 While the cost argument was
once significant-if only because no figures were available, the argument
should have been scuttled by the figures and statistics prepared by the
United States Government and presented to the Montreal ConferenceY.7
As the United States delegation to that Conference states, the estimated
36. In discussing this argument Mr. H. Drion states:
The idea that aviation would be impossible without limitation of liability
is flatly contradicted by the facts. Though USA law has no limitation of
liability of air carrier or aircraft operator . . . there is no country in the
world where civil aviation has developed to a comparative level. And not
only does American law not know of special limitations of liability for the
protection of aviation, but the claims awarded there against carriers and
operators are avowedly higher than anywhere else.
DRION, LIrrATIoNs OF LIABILrrY IN INTERNATIONAL Anm LAW (The Hague 1954).
37. The following estimated insurance costs were prepared by the CAB, on the
basis of estimates provided by one of the principal groups of underwriters of aviation
insurance in the United States, for presentation to the ICAO Montreal Conference:
ESTIMATED LIABILITY INSURANCE COSTS
Estimated Percentage Total Cost per
Limit of Liability Increase Revenue Passenger Mile
$ 8,300 .. $ 0.64
16,600 5% 0.68
25,000 9% 0.71
50,000 25% 0.81
75,000 38% 0.90
100,000 48% 0.96
200,000 72% 1.12
II ICA:O, SPEcIAL ICAO MEETING ON LIMITS FOR PASSENGERS UNDER THE WARSAW CON-
VENTION AND TnE HAGUE PROTOCOL 1-15 February 1966, Montreal 171 (1966).
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increase in insurance premium costs as a proportion of operating ex-
penses resulting from an increase from a $75,000 limit to a $100,000
limit would be "somewhere between the cost of the olive and the cost
of the gin in the martini, and nowhere near the cost of an inflight
movie." 18 And though there is still idle speculation that the increased
costs will be exorbitant, no country has yet been able, despite the pas-
sage of almost two years since the May, 1966, interim arrangement, to
disprove that statement."°
This is not to suggest however that there are no realistic or well based
objections to a high limit. It has been argued, with some justification,
that if a limit acceptable to the United States is achieved, the very height
of that limit will stimulate a world-wide trend toward verdict and settle-
ment figures much higher than has been customary, and much higher
than would be appropriate in any country other. than the United States.
40
It has also been argued, again with some justification, that if a high limit
is achieved, foreign nationals will be motivated to bring their suits, as-
suming venue, in the United States, where they can win verdicts and
settlements much higher than would be possible if they were suing in
their own countries. While foreign governments would probably not be
concerned about their nationals collecting high awards from United
States airlines in the New York courts, their concern becomes serious
when their airlines are sued in New York by their own nationals-not
to mention the nationals of third countries. A high limit, it is argued,
would not only stimulate forum shopping, but would necessarily tend
to increase the size of verdicts and settlements that foreign nationals
might otherwise receive.
The primary justification for this type of argument must lie in the
fact that foreign states have their own laws and practices for calculating
damages, and that the United States system should not be allowed to
interfere with or even influence the application of these laws and prac-
tices. This is not an unreasonable objective. In some nations the law
and practice for calculating damages requires that a decedent's insurance
38. Lowenfeld and Mendelsohn, supra note 3, at 567.
39. See Comments of the United States to ICAO Respecting the Report of the Panel
of Experts, November 22, 1967, ICAO Doc. C-WP/4648, Addendum No. 3, 29/11/67.
See also Report to the Secretary of State of the United States Member of the ICAO
Panel of Experts on Limits For Passengers Under the Warsaw Convention and the
Hague Protocol, Montreal, Canada (Second Session), July 4-18, 1967, at 9-11.
40. See generally, I, MINUTES, ICAO, SPECIAL ICAO MEETING ON LIMITS FOR PASSEN-
GERS UNDER THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND THE HAGUE PROTOCOL 1-15 February 1966,
Montreal (1966).
 Vol. 9:11181128
LEX DOMICILII AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION
or death benefits and government pension proceeds be taken into con-
sideration to reduce the amount of the award of damages.4 1 In some
nations law and practice require that the widow's remarriageability be
similarly considered.42 Furthermore, consider the broader question of
some particular emerging nation whose courts have never awarded a
verdict in excess of the Hague limits and whose Administration believes
that the Hague limits are entirely adequate for the survivors of dece-
dents of that nation. Why, it is asked, should the individualistic United
States desire for a high limit be satisfied if, to do so, means affecting
adversely the laws, practices, and attitudes of so many foreign courts and
administrations?
In summary, then, and apart from the intangible factors and insub-
stantial arguments, the objectives of those opposing a substantial increase
in the limits of liability must be both to avoid needless worldwide in-
creases in verdicts and settlements, and to preclude forum shopping by
foreign nationals in United States, and particularly New York, courts.
Admitting the reasonableness of these objectives, it may be said that be-
fore the United States can hope to achieve a higher international limit
on liability appropriate by American standards, a sound regime to satisfy
these objectives of the low level proponents, and to protect the law,
practice, and customs of their countries must first be found.
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN UNITED STATES CASE LAW
SUGGEST A POSSIBLE SOLUTION
Judge Jessup has written that "Every generation imagines it is con-
fronted with stupendous unprecedented novelties." 43 The spectacular
growth of international air travel seems to have confronted this genera-
tion with such a novelty in the question of the proper choice of law to
be applied in tort litigation resulting from air accidents. "The ice began
to form on the wings over Pennsylvania; the wrong handle was pulled
in the air over Maryland so that the de-icer broke down over West Vir-
41. With respect to insurance proceeds, see Frederick v. Ottawa Aero Sen'ices, Ltd.,
[1964] 1 Ont. 315 (1963); 2 KEMPw & KEMP, THE QUANTUm OF DAMAGES (1956); DRIoN,
LimrrAnoN OF LARILITIFS I- INTERNATONAL AIR LAW (1954); Rosevear, Wrongful
Death Actions Under the Canadian Carriage by Air Act, 38 CAN. BAR REv. 216 (1960).
With respect to pension proceeds, see Sundberg, REmcNT DEVELOpMENTS IN SCeNri-
NAViAN AIR LAW, 3 ARKIV FOR LuF'mErr 97-111 (1966).
42. See Gatenby v. Altoona Aviation Corporation, 259 F. Supp. 573 (W.D. Pa. 1966).
43. Jessup, Uniformity and Diversity in the Law of Nations, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 341,344
(1964).
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ginia, and the plane fell in Virginia." 11 Where did the tort occur? The
age of the long-range, high-speed commercial jet makes the question
still more difficult to answer.
The classical choice of law rule has been that damages are governed
by the law applicable at the place where the accident occurred.45 For
airlines and other multi-state or multi-national operating enterprises, the
lex loci rule was by far the simplest and the most certain of application.
It took no account of the person. If the accident happened in X state
or nation, that law applied irrespective of what may have been the in-
dividual circumstances or exigencies of the person.
But as legal institutions progressed and as individual rights slowly
came to be recognized as far more important than they were looked
upon in the days of the industrial revolution and "rugged individualism,"
the law made its own effort to keep apace. It is perhaps ironic that
though lex loci had long been questioned by academicians and legal
writers,46 it was first challenged in court by the airline industry-the
most recent arrival on the scene of great multi-national operating enter-
prises. In 1961, lex loci was abandoned by the New York Court of Ap-
peals in air accident cases. Once the door was opened, the progression
of cases developed the now well-recognized doctrine of "predominant
contacts."
The Contacts Doctrine in Air Accident Litigation
United States courts had not challenged the classical lex loci delicti
doctrine as the choice of law rule in tort claims until the now famous
case of Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. was decided by the New
York Court of Appeals in 1961.48 In that case the New York court re-
quired the plaintiff to sue on the Wrongful Death Statute of Massa-
chusetts, the state in which the crash occurred, but refused on public
policy grounds to enforce the Massachusetts statute's provision limiting
damages, 49 saying:
44. Knauth, Renvoi and other Conflicts Problems in Transportation Law, 49 COLUM.
L. REv. 1, 19 (1949).
45. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934). "The law of the place of the
wrong determines whether a person has sustained a legal injury."
46. E.g., EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 222(3) (1962).
47. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 536 (1961).
48. Id.
49. At the time of the accident recoverable damages were limited by the Massa-
chusetts Wrongful Death Statute to $15,000. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 299, § 2 (1955).
The limit has been raised and is currently $50,000. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 299,
§ 2 (Supp. 1965).
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Modem conditions make it unjust and anomalous to subject the
traveling citizen of this state to the varying laws of other states
through and over which they move.... An air traveler from New
York may in a flight of a few hours' duration pass through sev-
eral [states]. . . . His plane may meet with disaster in a state he
never intended to cross but which the plane has flown because of
bad weather or other unexpected developments, or an airplane's
catastrophic descent may begin in one state and end in another.
The place of injury becomes entirely fortuitous. Our courts should
if possible provide protection for our own state's people against
unfair and anachronistic treatment of the lawsuits which result
from these disasters.
There is available, we find, a way of accomplishing this con-
formably to our State's public policy and without doing violence
to the accepted pattern of conflict of law rules.50
Thus began the development of a significant body of law which re-
jects the venerable lex loci delicti doctrine, and holds that the choice of
law in awarding damages is no longer controlled by the wholly fortui-
tous fact of the place of the accident.51 This departure from an estab-
lished rule evoked an abundance of critical legal writing,5 2 but the way
was opened for the development of the more flexible and now well
recognized doctrine of predominant contacts enunciated in Babcock v.
Jackson in 1963.
50. 9 N.Y.2d at 39, 172 N.E.2d at 527 (Emphasis Added).
51. In Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cit. 1962) (rehearing en
banc), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 912 (1963), a case arising from the same accident, Kilberg
was attacked on constitutional grounds as a failure of the New York court to recognize
the full faith and credit clause. On a hearing by a panel of the court, the panel held
that "The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution barred New
York courts, and a federal court . . . from awarding unlimited recovery in a law suit
'based' upon the Massachusetts statute." Id. at 555. Upon rehearing en banc, however,
the court held that ". . . the ruling of the New York Court of Appeals in Kilberg was
a proper exercise of the state's power to develop conflict of laws doctrine. . .. " Id.
at 556. The court characterized the panel's rationale as the ". . . first decision to
'freeze' into constitutional mandate a choice-of-law rule derived from what may be
described as the Ice Age of conflict of laws jurisprudence-at a time when that
jurisprudence is in an advanced stage of thaw." Id. at 557.
52. E.g., Currie, Conflict, Crisis and Confusion in New York, in SE.ECTED EssAys
oN THm CoNFLiCr OF LAws 690 (1963); Comment, Selection of Law Governing Measure
of Damages for Wrongful Death, 61 CoLum. L. REv. 1497 (1961) (". .. it may be
treated as a minor aberration . . .a precedent to be discarded ... "); Comment, Lex
Loci Delicti or Lex Fori, 28 U. CHi L. REv. 733 (1961).
53. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963). A New York resident riding as a guest of
another New York resident on a weekend trip to Canada was seriously injured when
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania adopted the contacts doctrine in
Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc.,54 in October 1964, in a case arising
from the death of a Pennsylvania domiciliary while a passenger aboard
defendant's airline when the aircraft crashed on landing at Denver, Col-
orado. The Pennsylvania court held:
Thus, after careful review and consideration of the leading
authorities and cases, we are of the opinion that the strict lex loci
delicti rule should be abandoned in Pennsylvania in favor of a
more flexible rule which permits analysis of the policies and in-
terests underlying the particular issue before the court.55
It seems, therefore, to have been well settled by 1964, that, especially
in air accident litigation, the law of the place of the accident would no
longer be the choice of law, but rather the law of the State having the
predominant contacts.5 6 Although recent air accident cases can be found
the host lost control of the car. Ontario's guest statute would have barred suit in
Ontario, and the action was brought in New York where no such bar is recognized
under New York law. The New York court, although not completely adopting the
public policy rationale of Kilberg, again rejected the traditional choice of law rule.
The court instead chose to weigh the most significant contacts with the occurrence
and the parties to arrive at its decision.
The court found that New York, the place where the relationship arose, where the
trip began and was to end, was the jurisdiction with the dominant contacts, and not
Ontario, where the accident was merely fortuitous. The court accordingly held that
New York had the superior claim for application of its law.
For examples of the debate provoked by Babcock, see Cavers, Cheatham, Currie,
Ehrenzweig, Leflar and Reese, Connents on Backcock 'v. Jackson: A recent Develop-
ment in Conflict of Laws, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 1212 (1963); Chappell, Lex Loci Delicti
and Babcock 'v. Jackson, 7 .M. AND MARY L. REv. 249 (1966).
54. 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
55. Id. at 22, 203 A.2d at 805.
56. The proposed Introductory Note to the 1964 tentative draft of The Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws states:
The original Restatement stated that, with minor exceptions, all substantive
questions relating to the existence of a tort claim are governed by the local
law of the place of wrong. ". . . The principal changes are (a) that torts
are now said to be governed by the local law of the State which has the
most significant relationship with the occurrence and with the parties, and
(b) that separate rules are stated for different kinds of torts. The identity
of the state of most significant relationship in a given case will depend
upon the kind of tort involved and upon a number of other factors."
REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CoNFLi c OF LAWS Chap. 9, Introductory Note at 1-2 (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1964). But see Wolens, A Thaw in the Reign of Lex Loci Delicti, 32
J. AIR L. & COM. 408 (1966) (Analyses jurisdictions as Trend Jurisdictions, Waivering
Jurisdictions, and Traditional Jurisdictions, and concludes that there is no clear answer
as to what the new rule is.)
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which still adhere to the lex loci rule,57 the majority seem clearly to have
adopted the more flexible contacts rule in cases of this type.
In 1965, the New York court had the opportunity to apply the con-
tacts doctrine from the viewpoint of a "disinterested third state." In
Long v. Pan American World Airways Inc.,58 plaintiff's decedent, a
57. E.g., The Cherokee Laboratories, Inc. v. Rogers, 398 P.2d 520 (1965); Goranson
Adm'r v. Capitol Airlines, 345 F.2d 750 (6th Cir. 1965). But see Norman v. Mustang
Aviation, Inc., 10 Av. L. REP. 17,300 (Tex. Civ. App. May 24, 1967).
One important recent airline case in which the U. S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York did not follow the Kilberg and Babcock doctrine was Ciprari
v. Serviceos Aeros Cruzeiro 245 F. Supp. 819 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff'd 359 F.2d 855 (2d
Cir. 1966). Mr. Ciprari, a New York domiciliary, had flown to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil,
on Pan-American. But upon arrival he was directed by his employer to continue on to
Sao Paulo. Had Mr. Ciprari continued his original New York-Rio flight he would
have come within the definition of international transportation under the Warsaw
Convention, and would have been entitled to at least an $8,300 recovery. He chose
instead to purchase-or his employer gave him-a new ticket on Cruziero for the flight
to Sio Paulo. As a consequence of this wholly fortuitous transaction, he was on a
purely domestic journey in Brazil. The Cruziero flight crashed on landing in Slo Paulo,
and Mr. Ciprari sustained severe injuries. Brazilian law limited liability to 100,000
cruzeiros worth at the time of trial, about 70 U.S. dollars. The U.S. District Court
held that Brazil, as the place where that segment of the trip commenced and ended
(rather than New York where the passenger resided, and from which he had originated
his travel) had the greater contacts, and Brazilian law should therefore be applied as to
the issue of the measure of damages. The federal court recognized Kilberg and Babcock,
but refused to apply New York law as the choice of law because of a New York
Court of Appeals holding, just three months earlier which appeared to deviate from
Babcock. In Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792 (1965), the New York
court, declaring that it was applying the Babcock Doctrine, nonetheless refused to
permit a New York resident to sue another New York resident for injuries arising
from an automobile accident which occurred in Colorado. Although professedly fol-
lowing Babcock, the court found factual distinction in that the residents involved in
the accident in Dymn formed their host-guest relationship in Colorado. The accident in
Dym "arose out of Colorado based activity," and the place of accident was thus held
nor to be fortuitous.
In light of this Dym decision, the federal court in Ciprari said:
... it seems reasonably clear . . . that at least a majority of the New
York Court of Appeals, and probably all'of the judges of that court, would
apply the law of Brazil, including that part of Brazilian law limiting
damages against an air carrier, to the case at bar.
245 F. Supp. at 824.
This seeming inconsistency in the New York holdings was resolved the following
year in October, 1966. In Macey v. Rozbicki, 18 N.Y.2d 289, 221 NXE.2d 380 (1966),
the court reversed a lower court decision that Dym, not Babcock, controlled, and
held that New York, as the place where both resided, had the dominant contacts.
Considering the weight the federal court had given to the apparent inconsistency, in
New York, it can reasonably be concluded that Ciprari would have been decided
differently had it been tried a year later.
58. 16 N.Y.2d 337, 213 N.E.2d 796 (1965).
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resident of Pennsylvania, was aboard a Pan American flight from San
Juan to Philadelphia which disintegrated in flight, the wreckage falling
to earth near Elkton, Maryland. The plaintiffs, brothers and sisters of
decedent, were also residents of Pennsylvania. The action was brought
in New York where defendant has its principal place of business.
The New York Court of Appeals was faced with the question of
whether to apply Pennsylvania law, or Maryland law-the place of the
accident. Both states permit recoveries for wrongful death, but Maryland
law creates a cause of action only for the surviving spouse, parent or
child of the deceased.50 The court, applying the principle laid down in
Babcock, selected Pennsylvania law rather than that of Maryland. Penn-
sylvania, the court held, had the most significant contacts, while "Mary-
land's sole relationship with the occurrence is the purely adventitious
circumstance that the aircraft wreckage fell on Maryland following an
explosion while aloft." 60
With Long it became certain that New York would not only apply
the contacts doctrine for its own citizens, but would also open its courts
as a disinterested third state, to domiciliaries of other states. It appears
that every international carrier operating in this country is therefore
now subject to suit in New York.
In the light of the case development since 1961, it appears that courts
in the United States, faced with a choice of law issue arising from an
international air accident, will almost surely apply the law of the juris-
diction having the most significant contacts with the victim and his
situation-especially if the survivors would otherwise be limited to a low
recovery. Thus, if a victim bought his ticket and began his journey from
the state in which he resides, his contacts with that state, under the con-
tacts doctrine, would be sufficient for the law of that state to be applied,
even if the accident should occur on Air India while landing in Paris.
Does Contacts Really Mean Domicile?
There is one very important aspect of the preceding case law develop-
ment which seems not to have been widely discussed. In all of the air-
line cases which have followed the contacts doctrine, even though the
courts have spoken in terms of public policy or predominant contacts,
the choice of law has always been resolved in favor of the victim's dom-
icile or residence.
59. MD. CoDE ANN. art 67, § 4 (1957).
60. 16 N.Y.2d at 342, 213 N.E.2d at 798.
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In Kilberg the New York court extended the effect of a New York
constitutional public policy requirement for the benefit of the descend-
ants of a New York resident who had been killed in Massachusetts. 61 In
Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, arising from the same Massachusetts
crash,6 2 a federal court applied New York law as the choice of law for a
New York "citizen and domiciliary." '3
The Pennsylvania court in Griffith chose to apply Pennsylvania law
for the benefit of the brothers and sisters of "a Pennsylvania domiciliary"
killed in Colorado. Although recognizing the existence of another con-
tact, i.e., that the contractual relationship between decedent and the air-
line was consummated in Pennsylvania, the court said:
Our Commonwealth, the domicile of decedent and his family,
is vitally concerned with the administration of decedent's estate
and the well-being of the surviving dependents to the extent of
granting full recovery, including expected earnings.64
In Long,05 the New York court, while noting the contact that the pas-
sengers had purchased their ticket in Philadelphia, said:
Both of the passengers had resided in Pennsylvania.... They are
survived by brothers and sisters who are residents of Pennsylvania,
as are the plaintiffs, who were appointed executors and administra-
tors pursuant to the laws of the state.66
In Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,67 another case arising from the
same Massachusetts accident as in Kilberg, the surviving widow gave up
her New York residence one month after the crash, and went to live
with her mother in Maryland. The court nonetheless held:
New York was the domicile of the decedent and that of his
principal beneficiaries at the time of his death. New York has an
interest in applying its law ... to see that the decedent's surviving
dependents domiciled there at the time of the occurrence are ade-
quately cared for during the period when the decedent would
61. See p. 1130 supra.
62. See note 51 supra.
63. 309 F.2d at 556.
64. 416 Pa. at 23, 203 A.2d at 807.
65. See p. 1133 supra.
66. 16 N.Y. 2d at 339, 213 N2E.2d at 796.
67. 373 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1967).
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have continued to support them, to preserve its jurisdiction over
the devolution of its domiciliary's estate and to protect creditors
of the decedent who would present claims against that estate .... 68
In each of these cases, although there were other contacts considered,
it is significant that the courts always resolved the final choice of law
for damages in -favor of the victim's domicile or place of residence. The
decisions have always been in favor of the law providing the most just
economic result for surviving families. Although the courts have used
the well known rubrics of domicile, residence, or home, the selection of
law has always been the one which would most benefit surviving de-
pendents in the economic environment in which they are most likely to
continue to live.
This conclusion may have been what the Kilberg court had in mind
when it spoke of public policy. Public policy, however, could not con-
veniently have been applied by a neutral state, such as New York in
Long, so the predominance of contacts doctrine proved to be much
more flexible.
But whether the doctrine applied, be public policy, or contacts, the
proper and desirable result is the one which will provide for the sur-
vivors a standard of living similar to that which they would have enjoyed
had the family breadwinner continued to live. This is determinable by
the economic standards of the place in which the victim and his family
were living, and the place in which the surviving family will most likely
continue to live.
It is submitted therefore, that this tendency of the courts to resolve
the choice of law issue in favor of the victim's domicile or residence be
recognized, and that domicile, or residence, be made the required choice
of law in these cases.
Contacts, other than Domicile, can be as Fortuitous as the Place
of Accident
The criticism of the lex loci doctrine, and one of the primary reasons
for abandoning it in favor of the contacts doctrine, was the completely
fortuitous relationship the victim may have with the place of accident.
In the words of the court in Long, the only relationship the law of the
place of accident has with the occurrence "is the purely adventitious
circumstance that the aircraft wreckage fell [there]." But even under
68. Id. at 724.
69. 16 N.Y.2d at 342, 213 N.E.2d at 798.
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the contacts doctrine, each of the contacts other than residence or
domicile, may be as adventitious as the place of accident.70
Consider for example the businessman with offices in New York City
who is domiciled in Greenwich, Conn., but who, on a business trip, takes
a flight departing from Newark Airport. Or, for example, the New
Jersey resident who works in New York City, booked his ticket there,
and began his journey from John F. Kennedy Airport in New York. In
both of these examples, the place of contract as well as the airport of
departure are entirely fortuitous; each could have been different, de-
pending on personal convenience, airline operating schedules, etc. The
only stable contact, and the only contact that is not fortuitous is the
passenger's residence. Why then, should not this law be the most ap-
propriate choice of law in the event of a later accident.
The examples are even more poignant in an international context.
Consider the successful New York businessman, domiciled in New York,
who is on a vacation trip to Europe. He is called to return to corporate
headquarters in New York for an important meeting, after which he will
return to Europe to continue his vacation. For the trip to New York
he buys a Madrid-New York-Madrid ticket in Madrid aboard Iberian
Airlines. If the accident occurs on take-off at Madrid, all the contacts,
except domicile, would point to Spanish law. Yet, would not a New
York Court, on public policy grounds, though obviously not on con-
tacts, be justified in applying New York rather than Spanish law?
To apply the law of the jurisdiction with the predominance of con-
tacts in these situations would be to apply a doctrine which would yield
as unsatisfactory a result as would the doctrine of lex loci delicti. In the
determination of damages, it would seem that the most important con-
sideration should be not the fortuity of a combination of contacts, but
rather the single definitive factor of where the victim was domiciled.
The jurisdiction of "the domicile of the decedent and his family is vitally
concerned with the administration of the decedent's estate and the well-
being of surviving dependents." 7 1 The State of domicile of the decedent
has an interest in applying its law ". . . to see that the decedent's surviv-
ing dependents domiciled there at the time of the occurrence are ade-
70. Contram, Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, 201 So.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. Fla.
1967). "A domiciliary or other forum in which a transitory action is brought may in
these times be equally fortuitous."
71. Griffith v. United Airlines, Inc. 203 A.2d 796, 807 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1964).
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quately cared for during the period when the decedent would have con-
tinued to support them .. ." 72
A PROPOSAL TO MAKE DOMICILE THE REQUIRED CHOICE OF LAW
UNDER ARTICLE 2 8 OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION
It is proposed, therefore, that domicile be made the mandatory uni-
form choice of law under the Warsaw Convention. Incorporating a
uniform rule for awarding damages, with required multilateral applica-
tion, would meet the objectives of the law liability proponents, and
would thereby make possible an increase in the limit or, indeed, a re-
moval of the limit altogether.
The Proposal
The mandatory application requirement could be accomplished by
amending Article 2813 paragraph (2), and adding a new paragraph (3)
as follows:
(2) Questions of procedure, and determination of domicile for
the purposes of paragraphs (1) and (3) of this Article, shall be
governed by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.
(3) Irrespective of the court in which the action is brought in
accordance with paragraph (1), damages awarded under this
Article for death or personal injury shall be calculated and awarded
in accordance with the local law and practice of the domicile of
the passenger suffering death or personal injury.
With this type of amendment, it would only be necessary to delete
Article 22 (1)74 in order to eliminate the limit altogether.75
72. Gore v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. 373 F.2d 717, 724 (2d Cir. 1967).
.73. Article 28 of the Convention presently reads as follows:
(1) An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff,
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the
court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or
-where he has a place of business through which the contract has been
anade, or before the court at the place of destination.
(2) Questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the court
to which the case is submitted.
,74. !For the present wording of Article 22 of the Convention see note 9 supra.
',7,.. It should be noted that a proposal along somewhat similar lines has recently been
,elsewhere advanced by Mr. Alan Mendelsohn of the Department of State. See Mendel-
sohn, A Conflicts of Laws Approach to the Warsaw Convention, - J. AIR L. & CoM.
- (1968). However, that proposal suffered from several defects. First, for what
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Advantages of the Proposal
The foremost advantage of the proposal is that it provides a regime
which should satisfy the objectives of the low limit proponents. 76 Re-
quiring all courts to award damages in accordance with the law and
practice of the passenger's domicile removes the motivation to forum-
shop in United States courts. Moreover, it enables developing countries
to set their own presumably lower limits applicable to their own domi-
ciliaries. By setting this lower limit, they should be able effectively to
avoid what they fear will become a needless increase in settlements and
verdicts world-wide. Finally, it will enable domiciliaries of the United
States77 and other developed countries to recover more adequate awards
in those cases where, by reason of the forum limitations in Article
28 (1),78 they are now forced to sue in the courts of emerging countries.
In short, no matter where the suit is brought, damages would be awarded
as though the plaintiff were suing in the courts of his own country.
It can, of course, be argued that this looks like a return to the days
of British imperialism where the object was to clothe every British sub-
ject, no matter where he happened to be, with the protection of British
law and the Union Jack.79 But whatever may have been the objections
to that approach, the difference between that approach and the proposal
under consideration is that under the latter, every domiciliary, not just
British, will carry his law with him wherever he goes. The system is thus
totally devoid of discrimination and both fair and just in application.
Irrespective of the court in which survivors bring suit, equity and
fairness require that damages be awarded in accordance with the law
and practice of the decedent's domicile. Only by this means can a re-
covery be effected that would reflect the prevailing economic conditions
in which the survivors will continue to live.
Furthermore, if the law and practice in the jurisdiction of the pas-
appears to be no sound reason, the proposal included an overall limit on liability.
Second, it made no provision for the law that would be used to determine domicile.
And finally, it failed to distinguish between a court's choice of applying either the
local law of the state of domicile or that state's conflict of laws rule. In other words,
the proposal continued the built-in disadvantage of permitting a court to apply the
now largely discredited doctrine of "renvoi". See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLIcr
OF Lxws § 332, comment e at 12-13 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960).
76. See p. 1126 supra.
77. See p. 1124 supra.
78. See note 73 supra.
79. For a discussion of nationality and "personal law" see CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTER-
NATIoNAL LAw 194-99 (6th ed. 1961).
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senger's domicile requires that decedent's insurance or death benefits
or government pension proceeds be taken into consideration to reduce
the amount of damages awarded,"' the persons suing on his behalf should
not be able to avoid this diminution simply by suing in a foreign court.
Nor should an airline be forced to pay a higher verdict only because of
the plaintiff's wise selection of forum. If the Administration of a coun-
try, in its legislative judgment, limits the amount domiciliaries may re-
cover, such a limitation should not be avoidable simply by bringing suit
outside that country. If lex domicilii is adopted as proposed, these na-
tional laws and practices will always be respected irrespective of where
suit is brought.
CONCLUSION
There appears to be very little precedent in international law for this
proposal. A recent study of current developments in private interna-
tional law by Professor deNova of the University of Pavia, Italy, dis-
cusses the trend toward legislating conflicts of law rules in European
and South American countries.8 ' The law of the domicile is drafted into
this legislation as applicable for certain purposes, e.g., stateless persons,
contract, interspousal relationships. The application of lex dornicilii is
similarly accepted for certain purposes in the United States. But as the
choice of law for tort, lex loci delicti is the required choice in almost all
countries-as it was in the United States before Kilberg.
A notable exception appears in the Benelux Convention on Private
International Laws2 concluded by representatives of the three Benelux
States in 1951. Article 18 of that Convention reads:
(1) The law of the country where an act has taken place shall
determine if that act is unlawful and also any obligations arising
therefrom.
(2) However, if the effects of an unlawful act are produced
within the legal system of some country other than the country
where the act has taken place, the obligations arising therefrom
shall be determined by the law of that other country.8 3
80. See note 41 supra.
81. de Nova, Current Developments in Private International Law, 13 Am. J. CoMp. L.
542 (1964).
82. Uniform Law on the Conflict of Laws, as laid down by a Treaty concluded at
the Hague, May 11, 1951, between Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg. English
translation appears in I INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 426 (1952).
83. Id. at 430.
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Under paragraph (1), obligations arising from a tort are governed by
the lex loci delicti. However, under paragraph (2), when the circum-
stances are such that the effects of a tort take place in another country,
the legal consequences are determined by the law of that other country.
The report of the standing committee discussed as an example the case
of a collision between two motorcars operated and owned by persons
both living in the neighboring country. Significantly, the Report con-
cluded that "the legal consequences of such an accident are always
settled according to the law of the domicile of the parties." 8
Professor Eek of the University of Stockholm, in an article entitled
"Babcock in Sweden","' has addressed the question: "Is the lex loci
delicti invariably applicable to all types of torts and to all phases of a
tort case?" 56 The question, he states, is of equally great importance in
countries other than the United States, particularly in relation to traffic
accidents with circumstances similar to those in Babcock v. Jackson. In
an effort to determine what advice a Swedish lawyer would give to a
Swedish citizen injured in an accident in Italy, Professor Eek concludes
that the cautious lawyer would have to conclude that lex loci delicti
would be applied by a Swedish court. But that lawyer must make this
cautious conclusion, Eek adds, because the Swedish courts have not dealt
with this question since 1935.87 Although assuming that the court would
apply lex loci delicti, Eek concludes that:
The circumstances in some accident cases show, however, that
the application of the lex loci may lead to what are looked upon
by both the informed public and the courts themselves as unde-
sirable or meaningless results.8 8
Eek submits that this question will probably not find solution in the
courts in Sweden, though the idea will be used in support of legislative
reform. 9
Eek's views, taken together with Article 18 of the Benelux Conven-
tion, may well reflect recognition of some of the consequences of the
growing trend toward mobility in Western Europe-a trend that started
84. Meijers, The Benelux Convention on Private International Law, 2 Am. J. ComI'.
L. 1, 9 (1953).
85. Eek, Babcock in Sweden, 54 CAL.m L. REv. 1557 (1966).
86. Id. at 1576.
87. Id. at 1578-80.
88. Id. at 1582.
89. Id. at 1583.
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in the United States after World War II and that today is no longer
a trend but an established way of life. Moreover, it goes without saying,
that as the standard of living continues to rise throughout the world-as
it has in Western Europe only since the late 1950's-the individual citi-
zen will become increasingly more mobile, on business trips, weekend
visits, and longer vacations. Lex loci delicti will be in no better position
to survive this trend in Europe and elsewhere than it was in the United
States at the moment of Kilberg in 1961. The benefits of the "contacts
doctrine" or, more properly speaking, lex domicilii, cannot help but be
adopted by all courts on behalf of their traveling nationals. The extent
and rapidity of judicial or legislative adoption will vary almost in direct
proportion to the extent and rapidity of the rise in the standard of living
within the particular country.
Mandatory application of lex domicilii as the choice of law for award-
ing damages in aviation accident litigation will provide uniform applica-
tion of law throughout the world. This is consistent with our objective
of keeping the law apace with modern times. To paraphrase our prede-
cessors quoted earlier 9 -what the engineers and the lawyers did for the
bi-plane and the Warsaw Convention in the 1920's, we must do for law
in the jumbo-jet airbus age of the 1970's.
Glenn J. Sedam, Jr.
90. See p. 1118 supra.
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